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ABSTRACT
Recently, the development and implementation of phishing
aacks require lile technical skills and costs. is uprising
has led to an ever-growing number of phishing aacks on
the World Wide Web. Consequently, proactive techniques to
ght phishing aacks have become extremely necessary. In
this paper, we propose HTMLPhish, a deep learning based
data-driven end-to-end automatic phishing web page clas-
sication approach. Specically, HTMLPhish receives the
content of the HTML document of a web page and employs
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to learn the seman-
tic dependencies in the textual contents of the HTML. e
CNNs learn appropriate feature representations from the
HTML document embeddings without extensive manual fea-
ture engineering. Furthermore, our proposed approach of
the concatenation of the word and character embeddings
allows our model to manage new features and ensure easy
extrapolation to test data. We conduct comprehensive exper-
iments on a dataset of more than 50,000 HTML documents
that provides a distribution of phishing to benign web pages
obtainable in the real-world that yields over 93% Accuracy
and True Positive Rate. Also, HTMLPhish is a completely
language-independent and client-side strategy which can,
therefore, conduct web page phishing detection regardless
of the textual language.
KEYWORDS
Phishing detection, Web pages, Classication model, Convo-
lutional Neural Networks, HTML
1 INTRODUCTION
e infamous phishing aack is a social engineering tech-
nique that manipulates internet users into revealing private
information that may be exploited for fraudulent purposes
[1]. is form of cybercrime has recently become common
because it is carried out with lile technical ability and sig-
nicant cost [2]. e proliferation of phishing aacks is
evident in the 46% increase in the number of phishing web-
sites identied between October 2018 and March 2019 by the
Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [3]. Most phishing
aacks are started by an unsuspecting Internet user merely
clicking on a link in a phishing email message that leads to a
bogus website. e impact of phishing aacks on individuals
such as identity the, psychological, and nancial costs can
be devastating.
Problem Definition
Recent research in phishing detection approaches has re-
sulted in the rise of multiple technical methods such as aug-
menting password logins [4], and multi-factor authentication
[5]. However, these techniques are usually server-side sys-
tems that require the Internet user to correspond with a
remote service, which adds further delay in the communi-
cation channel. Another popular phishing detection system
that relies on a centralised architecture is the phishing black-
list and whitelist methods [6]. A URL visited by an internet
user will be compared with the URL in these lists in real-
time. Although the list based methods tend to keep the false
positive rate low, however, a signicant shortcoming is that
the lists are not exhaustive, and they fail to detect zero-day
phishing aacks. To mitigate these limitations, researchers
have developed several anti-phishing techniques using ma-
chine learning models as they are mostly client-side based
and can generalise their predictions on unseen data.
Machine learning-based anti-phishing techniques typi-
cally follow specic approaches: (1) e required represen-
tation of features is rstly extracted, then (2) a phishing
detection machine learning model is trained using the fea-
ture vectors. To extract the feature representation from the
lexical and static components of a web page, the machine
learning models rely on the assumption that the infrastruc-
ture of phishing pages are dierent from legitimate pages.
For example, in [7], phishing web pages are automatically
detected based on handcraed features extracted from the
URL, HTML content, network, and JavaScript of a web page.
Furthermore, natural language processing techniques are
currently used to extract specic features such as the num-
ber of common phishing words, type of ngram, etc. from the
components of a web page [8–10].
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While the above approaches have proven successful, they
nevertheless are prone to several limitations, particularly in
the context of HTML analysis: i. inability to accommodate
unseen features: As the accuracy of existing models depends
on how comprehensive the feature set is and how imper-
vious the feature set remains to future aacks, they will
be unable to correctly detect new phishing web pages with
evolved content and structure without a regular update of
the feature set. ii. ey require substantial manual feature
engineering: Existing phishing detection machine learning
models require specialised domain knowledge in order to as-
certain the needed features suitable to each task (e.g., number
of white spaces in the HTML content, number of redirects,
and iframes, etc.). is is a tedious process, and these hand-
craed features are oen targeted and bypassed in future
aacks. It is also challenging to know the best features for
one particular application.
To address the above issues, we propose HTMLPhish, a
deep learning based data-driven end-to-end automatic phish-
ing web page classication approach. Specically, HTML-
Phish uses both the character and word embedding tech-
niques to represent the features of each HTML document.
en Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are employed
to model the semantic dependencies.
e following characteristics highlight the relevance of
HTMLPhish to web page phishing detection:
(1) HTMLPhish analyses HTML directly to help reserve
useful information. It also removes the arduous task required
for the manual feature engineering process.
(2) HTMLPhish takes into consideration all the elements of
an HTML document, such as text, hyperlinks, images, tables,
and lists, when training the deep neural network model.
We experimentally demonstrate the signicance of char-
acter and word embedding features of HTML contents in
detecting phishing web pages. We then propose a state-
of-the-art HTML phishing detection model, in which the
character and word embedding matrices are concatenated
before employing convolutions on the represented features.
Our proposed approach ensures an adequate embedding of
new feature vectors that enables straightforward extrapo-
lation of the trained model to test data. Subsequently, we
conduct extensive evaluations on a dataset of over 50,000
HTML documents collected over two months. is ensures
our evaluation seings reproduces real-world situations in
which models are applied to data generated up to the present
point and applied to new data.
We summarise the main contributions of this paper as
follows:
• Dierent from existing methods, our proposed model,
HTMLPhish, to the best of our knowledge, is the rst
to use only the raw content of the HTML document
of a web page to train a deep neural network model
for phishing detection. Manual feature engineer-
ing is reduced as HTMLPhish learns the represen-
tation in the features of the HTML document, and
we do not depend on any other complicated or spe-
cialist features for the task. Our proposed approach
takes advantage of the word and character embed-
ding matrix to present a phishing detection model
that automatically accommodates new features and
is therefore easily applied to test data.
• We conduct extensive evaluations on a dataset of
more than 50, 000 HTML documents collected in
two months. e distribution of the instances in
our dataset is similar to the ratio of phishing and
legitimate web pages found in the real-world. is
ensures that our evaluation metrics and results are
relevant to existing systems.
• Furthermore, we carried out a longitudinal study
on the eciency HTMLPhish to infer the maximum
retraining period, for which the accuracy of the sys-
tem does not reduce. Our result only recorded a
minimal 4% decrease in accuracy on the test data.
is conrms that HTMLPhish remains reliable and
temporally robust over a long period.
We organised the remainder of the paper as follows: the
next section provides an overview of related works on pro-
posed techniques of detecting phishing on web pages. Sec-
tion 3 gives the prior knowledge on Convolutional Neural
Networks, and Section 4 provides an in-depth description of
our proposed model. Section 5 elaborates on the dataset col-
lection, while the detailed results on the evaluations of our
proposed model are found in Section 6. Finally, we conclude
our paper in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORKS
In this section, we address two most closely related topics
to our work: the phishing web page detection using feature
engineering and the Deep Learning method (especially for
NLP).
Feature Engineering for Phishing Web Page
Detection
ese techniques extract specic features from a web page
such as JavaScript, HTML web page, URL, and network fea-
tures. ese are fed into machine learning algorithms to
build a classication model. ese machine learning tech-
niques dier in the type of heuristics and number of feature
sets used and the optimisation algorithm applied to the ma-
chine learning algorithm. ese techniques are based on the
fact that both the phishing and benign web pages have a
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dierent content distribution of extracted features. e ac-
curacy of heuristics and machine learning-based techniques
critically depends on the type of features extracted, and the
machine learning algorithm applied. Many phishing detec-
tion techniques have been built on dierent proposed feature
sets.
Varshney et al [11] proposed LPD, a client-side based web
page phishing detection mechanism. e strings from the
URL and page title from a specied web page is extracted
and searched on the Google search engine. If there is a
match between the domain names of the top T search results
and the domain name of the specied URL, the web page is
considered to be legitimate. e result from their evaluations
gave a true positive rate of 99.5%.
Smadi et al. [12] proposed a neural network model that
can adapt to the dynamic nature of phishing emails using
reinforcement learning. e proposed model can handle
zero-day phishing aacks and also mitigate the problem of
a limited dataset using an updated oine database. eir
experiment yielded a high accuracy of 98.63% on y features
extracted from a dataset of 12,266 emails.
e selection of features from various web page elements
can be an expensive process from security risk and techno-
logical workload angle. For example, it can be prolonged
and somewhat problematic to extract specic feature sets.
Besides, it needs specialist domain expertise to dene which
features are essential.
Deep Learning
Due to its performance in many applications, Deep Learn-
ing has aracted increased interest in recent years [13–15].
e core concept is to learn the feature representation from
unprocessed data instantaneously without any manual fea-
ture engineering. Under this premise, we want to use Deep
Learning to detect phishing HTML content by directly learn-
ing how features from the raw HTML string is represented
instead of using specialist features that are manually engi-
neered.
As we want to train our Deep Learning networks using
textual features, it is, therefore, essential to discuss NLP
as it relates to Deep Learning. Deep learning techniques
have been successful in a lot of NLP tasks, for example, in
document classication [16], machine translation [17], etc.
Recurrent neural networks (e.g., LSTM [18]) have been ex-
tensively applied due to their ability to exhibit temporal
behaviour and capture sequential data. However, CNN has
become brilliant substitutes for LSTMs, especially showing
excellent performance in text classication and sentiment
analysis as CNN learns to recognize paerns across space
[19].
Very few aempts have been made to use Deep Learning
to detect phishing web pages using web page components.
Bahnsen et al. [20] proposed a phishing classifying scheme
that used features of the URLs of a web page as input and
implemented the model on an LSTM network. e results
yielded gave an accuracy of 98.7% accuracy on a corpus of 2
million phishing and legitimate URLs. e authors of [21]
proposed a CNN based model which combines the outputs
of two Convolutional layers to detect malicious URLs.
However, our review did not nd any existing approach
that detects malicious phishing web pages using only HTML
documents on Deep Learning. HTMLPhish learns the se-
mantic information present only in the character and words
in an HTML document to determine the maliciousness of
the web page. Our thorough analysis shows that phishing
web pages can be detected using only their HTML document
content.
3 PRELIMINARIES
We dene the problem of detecting phishing web pages using
their HTML content as a binary classication task for predic-
tion of two classes: legitimate or phishing. Given a dataset
with T HTML documents {(html1,y1), ..., (htmlT,yT)}, where
htmlt for t = 1, . . . , T represents an HTML document ,
while yt ∈ {0, 1} is its label. yt = 1 corresponds to a phish-
ing HTML document while yt = 0 is a legitimate HTML
document.
Deep Neural Network for Phishing HTML Document
Detection
e deep neural network that underlies HTMLPhish is a Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN). To detail a basic CNN for
HTML document classication, an HTML document is com-
prised of a string of characters or words. Our goal is to obtain
an embedding matrix html→s ϵRmaxlen×d , in a way that s
is made up of sets of adjoining inputs si ∈ (1, 2, ...,maxlen)
in a string, in which the input can be individual characters or
words from the HTML document. Each input is subsequently
transformed in an embedding siϵRd is the ith column of S
and the d-dimension is the vector size which is automati-
cally initialized and learnt together with the remainder of
the model.
In this paper, the embedding matrix was automatically
initialised, and for parallelisation, all sequences were padded
to the same length maxlen.
e CNN performs a convolution operation ⊗ over sϵRmaxlen×d
using:
ci = f (M ⊗ si :i+n−1 + bi )
followed by a non-linear activation where bi is the bias,
M is the convolving lter and n is the kernel size of the
convolution operation. Aer the convolution, a pooling step
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is applied (which in our model is the Max Pooling) in order
to decrease the feature dimension and determine the most
important features.
e CNN is capable of exploiting the temporal relation
of n kernel size in its input using the lter M to convolve
on each segment of n kernel size. A CNN model typically
contains several sets of lters with dierent kernel sizes (n).
ose are the model hyperparameters that are set by the
user. In this deep neural network, the convolution layer is
usually followed by a Pooling layer. e features from the
Pooling layer are then passed to dense layers to perform the
required classication. e entire network is then trained by
using backpropagation.
Note: In order to dierentiate our state-of-the-art model
from the baseline models, for the rest of this paper, we
will use the term HTMLPhish-Full to indicate HTMLPhish
trained with the proposed model unless otherwise stated,
while HTMLPhish-Character and HTMLPhish-Word repre-
sent the deep neural network model using only the character
and word embedding respectively.
4 THE PROPOSED MODEL
In this section, we elaborate on the architecture of our pro-
posed deep neural network model HTMLPhish-Full. e
network architecture seen in Figure 3 shows HTMLPhish-
Full has two input layers. e rst input layer processes the
raw HTML document into an embedding matrix made up
of character-level feature representations, while the second
input layer does the same with words. ese two branches
are concatenated in a dense layer called the Concatenation
layer. erefore, the embedding matrix in this model is the
sum of the character-level embedding matrix and the word
embedding matrix Cem +Wem where Cem →c ϵRmaxlen1×d ,
andWem →w ϵRmaxlen2×d . e features in the Concatena-
tion layer allows the preservation of the original information
in the HTML content. In the concatenation layer, the content
of both embedding layers are put alongside each other to
yield a 3 dimensional layer [Cem +Wem →(None, 180, 100)
+ (None, 2000, 100) = (None, 2180, 100)].
To generate the character-level embedding matrix Cem ,
the model learns an embedding, which takes the characteris-
tics of the characters in an HTML document. To do so, all
the distinct characters, including punctuation marks in the
corpus, are listed. We obtained 167 unique characters. We set
the length of the sequencesmaxlen1 = 180 characters. Every
HTML document with strings greater than 180 characters
is cut from the 180th character, and any HTML document
with characters smaller than 180 characters would be padded
up to 180 with zeroes. Before each character in our work
is embedded into a d-dimensional vector, we conduct a to-
kenization on the characters in the HTML document and
segment the characters into tokens as shown in Figure 1. An
index is associated with each token before being applied to
a d-dimensional character embedding vector where d is set
at 100, which is automatically initialised and learnt together
with the remainder of the model. To facilitate its implemen-
tation, each HTML document html is transformed into a
matrix, html→c ϵRmaxlen1×d , where d = 100 and maxlen1
= 180.
For the word embedding matrix Wem , rstly, the raw
HTML document is processed into word-level representa-
tions by the word embedding layer. To achieve this, all the
dierent words in the HTML document of the training cor-
pus are listed using the following approach: An HTML docu-
ment is split into individual words while treating all punctu-
ation characters as separate tokens. For example, as shown
in Figure 1, <!DOCTYPE html>, will be split into [′<′, ′!′,
′DOCTYPE ′, ′html ′]. We surmise that punctuation marks
provide important information benets for phishing HTML
document detection since punctuation marks are more preva-
lent and useful in the context of HTML documents than or-
dinary languages. HTML contains a sequence of markup
tags that are used to frame the elements on a website. Tags
contain keywords and punctuation marks that dene the
formaing and display of the content on the Web browser.
e listed unique words are used to create a dictionary where
every word becomes a feature. We obtained about 321,009
unique words in our dataset. We also padded the HTML doc-
uments to make the lengths of the HTML documents uniform
in terms of number of words (maxlen2 = 2000). Each unique
word is then embedded into a d-dimensional vector, where d
is set at 100, which is automatically initialised and learned
together with the remainder of the model. All the HTML
documents are converted to their respective matrix repre-
sentation (maxlen2 ×d), on which the CNN is applied where
d = 100 andmaxlen2 = 2000. Figure 1 shows an overview of
the character and word embedding layer.
Word EmbeddingCharacter Embedding
< ! D O < !
DOCT
YPE
html
1 54 5 83 1 54 4 6
0.02 0.15 0.09 0.88
0.58 0.69 0.17 0.43
0.27 0.65 0.41 0.56
0.01 0.67 0.78 0.44
0.98 0.34 0.42 0.59
0.81 0.26 0.03 0.11
<!DOCTYPE html><htmlclass="no_js"id="facebook"
Tokens
Sequence of 
Integers
Embedding 
Matrix
Figure 1: Conguration of the Embedding Layer
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Table 1: HTML Documents Used in this Paper
Dataset D1 D2
Date generated 11 - 18 Nov, 2018 10 -17 Jan, 2019
Legitimate Web Pages 23,000 24,000
Phishing Web pages 2,300 2,400
Total 25,300 26,400
We can now introduce Convolutionary layers using the
HTML document matrix (for all the HTML documents st∀t =
1, ...,T ) as the corpus. We applied 32 Convolutionary lters
MϵRd×n where n 8. e Max-Pooling layer whose features
are then passed to a 10 unit dense layer comes aer the
Convolutionary lters. e dense layer, which is regularised
by dropout, nally connects to a Sigmoid layer. en using
the ADAM optimisation algorithm [22], we train the model
through backpropagation.
Baseline Models
e baseline models, HTMLPhish-Character and HTML-
Phish-Word, whose architectures are detailed in Figure 3, are
CNN models trained either on character-level embeddings or
word-level embeddings, respectively. e embedding matri-
ces described above are applied to 32 Convolutionary lters
MϵRd×n where n 8. e next layer aer the Convolution-
ary lters is the Max-Pooling layer, whose features are then
passed to a 10 unit dense layer. e Dense layer, which also
is regularised by dropout, nally connects to a Sigmoid layer.
Also, the models are trained through backpropagation using
the ADAM optimisation algorithm.
5 DATASET
Data collection plays an essential role in phishing web page
detection. In our approach, we collated HTML documents
using a web crawler. We used the Beautiful Soup [23] library
in Python to create a parser that dynamically extracted the
HTML document from each nal landing page. We chose to
use Beautiful Soup for the following reasons:
(1) it has functional versatility and speed in parsing HTML
contents, and
(2) Beautiful Soup does not correct errors when analysing
the HTML Document Object Model (DOM). e HTML doc-
uments in our corpus include all the contents of an HTML
document, such as text, hyperlinks, images, tables, lists, etc.
Figure 2 shows an overview of the data collection stage.
Data Collection
Since phishing campaigns follow temporal trends in the com-
position of web pages, the earliest data obtained should al-
ways be used for training and the most recent data collected
for testing [24]. Dierent phishing pages created during
the same time may probably have the same infrastructure.
is could exaggerate an over-trained classication model’s
predictive output. To ensure our evaluation seings repro-
duces real-world situations in which models are applied on
data generated up to the present point and applied on new
web pages, we collected a dataset of HTML documents from
phishing and legitimate web pages over 60 days.
Also, to ensure the deployability of our model to real-word
systems, our data set is required to provide a distribution of
phishing to benign web pages obtainable on the Internet in
the real-world (≈ 10/100) [25, 26]. Given that when a bal-
anced dataset (1/1), is used, the results can yield a baseline
error [27]. Consequently, our training dataset D1 consisting
of HTML documents from 23,000 legitimate URLs and 2,300
phishing URLs was collected between 11 November 2018 to
18 November 2018. D1 dataset was used to train and vali-
date the three dierent variants of our model (HTMLPhish-
Character, HTMLPhish-Word, and HTMLPhish-Full). From
10 January 2019 to 17 January 2019, testing data set D2 con-
sisting of HTML document from 24,000 legitimate URLs and
2,400 phishing URLs were generated.
Note that D1 ∩ D2 = ∅. Also, our testing dataset D2,
is slightly larger than our training dataset D1. is is be-
cause learning with fewer data, and having decent tests on
a broader test data means that the detection technique is
generalised. is ensures that the features and model of
classication include specic features from legitimate and
phishing web pages and that the approach can be applied
to the vast number of online Web pages. In total, our cor-
pus was made up of 47,000 legitimate HTML documents and
4,700 phishing HTML documents, as shown in Table 1.
e legitimate URLs were drawn from Alexa.com’s top
500,000 domains, while the phishing URLs were gathered
from continuously monitoring Phishtank.com. e web
pages in our dataset were wrien in dierent languages.
erefore, this does not limit our model to only detecting
English web pages. We manually sanitised our corpus to
ensure no replicas or web pages that are pointing to empty
content. Alexa.com oers a top list of working websites that
internet users frequently visit, so it is an excellent source to
be used for our aim.
6 EVALUATION OF HTMLPHISH VARIANTS
Experimental Setup
Table 2 details the selected parameters we found gave the best
performance on our dataset bearing in mind the unavoidable
hardware limitation for our proposed HTMLPhish variants:
a. HTMLPhish-Character
b. HTMLPhish-Word
c. HTMLPhish-Full
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Data Collection
Tokenization
Length 
padding
Embedding
Convolutional 
Filters
Sigmoid 
Layer
Dense 
Layer
Output
Label
User Web page
<DOCTYPE html>
<html class="no-js" dir="ltr" lang="en" 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
Extract HTML
Preprocessing
Deep Neural Network
Figure 2: A Schematic Overview of the Stages Involved in Our Proposed Model
Input HTML Document
Character Embedding
No. Unique Charc X Maxlen1 X 
100
Word Embedding
No. Unique Words X Maxlen2 X 
100
32 Convolutional Filters
With 8 Kernel Sizes
32 Convolutional Filters
With 8 Kernel Sizes
Max Pooling Max Pooling
Dense Layer (10 Units)
Activation = ReLU
Dense Layer (10 Units)
Activation = ReLU
Input HTML Document
HTML 
Document 
Classification
Sigmoid Layer
HTML 
Document 
Classification
Sigmoid Layer
HTMLPhish-Character HTMLPhish-Word
Character Embedding
No. Unique Charc X Maxlen1 
X 100
Input HTML Document
Cem Embedding
Concatenated Character and Word representations
Max Pooling
Dense Layer (10 Units)
Activation = ReLU
HTML 
Document 
Classification
Sigmoid Layer
Input HTML Document
Word Embedding
No. Unique Words X Maxlen2 
X 100
Wem Embedding
32 Convolutional Filters
With 8 Kernel Sizes
HTMLPhish-Full
Figure 3: e Overall Architecture of HTMLPhish Variants
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Table 2: HTMLPhish-Full Deep Neural Network
Layers Values Activation
Embedding Dimension = 100 -
Convolution Filter = 32, Filter Size =
8
ReLU
Max Pooling Pool Size = 2 -
Dense1 No. of Neurons = 10,
Dropout = 0.5
ReLU
Dense2 No. of Neurons = 1 Sigmoid
Total Number of
Trainable Parameters
412,388,597 -
e three CNN models were implemented in Python 3.5
on a Tensorow backend and a learning rate of 0.0015 in the
Adam optimizer [22]. e batch size for training and testing
the model were adjusted to 20.
All HTMLPhish and baseline experiments were conducted
on an HP desktop with Intel(R) Core CPU, Nvidia adro
P600 GPU, and CUDA 9.0 toolkit installed.
Evaluation Metrics
Because of the severely imbalanced nature of our dataset,
we evaluated the performance of our models in terms of the
Area under the ROC Curve (AUC). We also used the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve in our evaluation. e
ROC curve is a probability curve, while the AUC depicts
how much the model can distinguish between two classes,
which for our model is - legitimate or phishing. e higher
the AUC value, the beer the performance of the model.
e ROC curve is ploed with the true positive rate (TPR)
against the false positive rate (FPR) where TPR = (T P )(T P+FN )
and FPR = (F P )(T N+F P ) . Where TP, FP, TN, and FN stand for the
numbers of True Positives, False Positives, True Negatives,
and False Negatives, respectively.
Additionally, we employed the precision, True Positive
Rate, and F-1 score metrics to evaluate the performance of
HTMLPhish and the baseline models. e True Positive Rate
computes the ratio of phishing HTML documents that are
detected by the models. In contrast, the precision metrics
compute the ratio of detected phishing HTML documents
that are actual phishes to the total number of detected phish-
ing HTML documents.
Overall Result
To record the performance of HTMLPhish-Full and the base-
line models on the D1 dataset, we split the dataset into 80%
for training, 10% for validation, and 10% for testing. Also, tak-
ing cognizance of how our data is severely imbalanced, we
ensured we manually shued the datasets before training.
e ROC curves of HTMLPhish and its variants are shown
in Figure 4. From the result detailed in Table 3, in gen-
eral, HTMLPhish-Full signicantly outperforms the other
two variants: HTMLPhish-Character, and HTMLPhish-Word.
While HTMLPhish-Character and HTMLPhish-Word have
similar performances, HTMLPhish-Full takes advantage of
the strengths of both and produces more consistently beer
results. Also, HTMLPhish-Full oered a signicant jump
in AUC over the other variants, while HTMLPhish-Word
performs slightly worse amongst the three.
On the D1 dataset, HTMLPhish-Full provided a 98% accu-
racy and 2% False Positive Rate. e minimal False Positive
Rates indicates the ratio of legitimate web pages, which are
incorrectly identied as a phish. is is helpful when the
model will be deployed in real-world scenarios as users will
not be inappropriately blocked from accessing legitimate
web pages.
Considering the computational complexity of HTMLPhish-
Full, it can be seen that on a dataset of over 25,000 HTML
documents, HTMLPhish-Full can be speedily trained within
7 minutes. Once trained, HTMLPhish-Full can evaluate an
HTML document in 1.4 seconds.
Comparison with State-Of-The-Art Techniques
We compared HTMLPhish-Full with the methodology, speed,
and performance of existing state-of-the-art models in [20]
and [28]. [28] is a Deep Neural Network with multiple layers
of CNNs that takes as input word tokens from a URL to
determine the maliciousness of the associated web page. On
the other hand, [20] takes as input the character sequence
of a URL and models its sequential dependencies using Long
short-term memory (LSTM) neural networks to classify a
URL as phishing or benign. We applied these techniques to
the HTML documents in the D1 dataset and also tested them
on the D2 dataset.
From the result detailed in Table 3 and Table 4, HTMLPhish-
Full provides beer precision, recall and comparable accu-
racy against the existing state-of-the-art models. e perfor-
mance of HTMLPhish-Word and [28] can be aributed to the
fact that it is trained on a denite dictionary of words from
the training data. erefore it will be unable to obtain useful
embeddings for new words in the test data. HTMLPhish-
Character and [20] perform beer with respect to the AUC
metric because the individual character embedding CNN can
learn structural paerns in the HTML document and can also
obtain feature representations for new words. is makes
it easy to be applied to the test data. In addition, due to the
limited number of characters, the scale of the CNN model us-
ing the individual embedding character remains xed when
compared to word-based model sizes. However, CNN models
built with individual character embeddings cannot exploit
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Table 3: Result of HTMLPhish and Baseline Evaluations on the D1 dataset
Models Accuracy Precision True Positive Rates F-1 Score AUC Training time
HTMLPhish-Full 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.93 6.75 mins
HTMLPhish-Word 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.88 10 mins
HTMLPhish-Character 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.90 3.5 mins
[28] 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.93 5.25 mins
[20] 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.91 18 mins
Table 4: Result of HTMLPhish and Baseline Evaluations on the D2 dataset
Models Accuracy Precision True Positive Rates F-1 Score AUC Testing time
HTMLPhish-Full 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.88 9 seconds
HTMLPhish-Word 0.90 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.73 107 seconds
HTMLPhish-Character 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.77 7 seconds
[28] 0.91 0.84 0.91 0.87 0.73 15 seconds
[20] 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.78 112 seconds
structural information available in long sequences in the
HTML document. It also disregards word borders and makes
it challenging to dierentiate special characters in the data.
Furthermore, CNN’s using only character level embedding
struggles to dierentiate information for scenarios where
phishing HTML documents try to imitate benign HTML doc-
uments through small modications to one or few words in
the HTML document[29]. is is because the Convolutional
lters will likely yield similar output from a sequence of char-
acters with a similar spelling. erefore, CNNs using only
character embeddings are not enough to obtain structural
information from the HTML document in detail. at is the
reason word embeddings must be taken into account. Con-
sequently, HTMLPhish-Full takes advantage of both word
and character embedding matrices to accommodate unseen
words in the test data, and therefore yield a beer result than
the other variants and baseline models.
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Figure 4: e ROC Curve of HTMLPhish Variants
Temporal Resilience
e techniques for implementing a phishing web page is
continuously evolving due to emerging technology applica-
tions for designing phishing web pages. e evaluation of
the resilience of this evolution is paramount for a phishing
web page detection technique. In this paper, we applied the
longitudinal study [30] by evaluating the accuracy of the
HTMLPhish-Full using freshly collected data. is study en-
abled us to infer a maximum retraining period, for which the
accuracy of the system does not reduce. For a security sup-
plier deploying HTMLPhish-Full in the wild, the retraining
time frame can provide an approximate cost of maintenance.
Using the evaluation metrics detailed above, we compared
the accuracy of HTMLPhish variants and baseline models on
the training data D1 with its accuracy when applied to the
test data D2 without retraining the model. From the results
in Table 4, HTMLPhish-Full provided a 98% accuracy on the
training dataset while yielding a 93% accuracy on the test
dataset. e result of our longitudinal study demonstrates
the readiness of HTMLPhish-Full for real-world deployment.
HTMLPhish-Full will remain temporally robust, and will not
need retraining within at least two months.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed HTMLPhish, a deep learning
based data-driven end-to-end automatic phishing web page
classication approach. HTMLPhish receives the HTML con-
tent of a web page as input and applies CNNs to learn the
semantic dependencies in both the characters and words in
the HTML document in a jointly optimized network. Fur-
thermore, we applied convolutions on a concatenation of
the matrix of character and word embeddings in order to
ensure the eective embedding of new words in the test
HTML documents. Our approach can learn context features
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from HTML documents without requiring extensive manual
feature engineering.
We evaluated our model using a comprehensive dataset
of HTML contents presented in a real-world distribution.
HTMLPhish provided a high precision rate, showing a tem-
porally stable result even when it was trained two months
before being applied to a test dataset.
e future work is to compare our model to feature engineering-
based models that extract features only from the HTML doc-
ument. Also, we intend to implement our model as a browser
extension. is will enable HTMLPhish to recognise phish-
ing websites in real-time.
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